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subcontractor.  We demonstrate analytically how multiple sourcing emerges as an 
organizational mechanism to balance cost advantages associated with outsourcing against 
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the bargaining structure and the optimal production mode and find that the optimal 
proportion of outsourcing is lower with sequential negotiations than with simultaneous 
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1. Introduction 
Many view in-house production and outsourced production as the main alternative production 
modes available to a firm. In line with such a viewpoint, discussions about the border of the firm 
often distinguish those circumstances when an activity or component is produced in-house from 
those when an external supplier acquires it as a market transaction (for example, Williamson 
(1979), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Holmström and Roberts (1998)). However, firms 
frequently source inputs externally from independent suppliers as well as within the boundaries 
of the firm. In the literature, scholars refer to such a practice as multiple sourcing, tapered 
integration, or partial outsourcing. For example, Nickerson and Silverman (2003) report that 
35% of interstate carriers in the trucking industry procure driving services from in-house as well 
as external sources.
3
   In another industry example, Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN) outsources 
approximately 20% of its production; NSN “generally prefers to have multiple sources for its 
components, but sources some components from a single or a small number of selected 
suppliers” (Nokia Annual Report 2008, Form 20-F).  
Researchers often argue that extreme production modes focusing exclusively either on in-house 
production or subcontracting mean that the firm loses bargaining power to the exclusive input 
supplier. Under such circumstances, multiple sourcing might be a mechanism to overcome this 
problem. According to this view, outsourcing may serve as a disciplining device to counteract 
union power and thereby foster competitiveness of in-house production. Similarly, in-house 
production provides a benchmark against which the firm can evaluate the competitiveness of 
external suppliers. Balancing the power of internal and external suppliers is, in fact, a delicate 
problem for managers. An important approach in the strategic management literature, dating 
back to Porter (1980), has viewed multiple sourcing as a mechanism whereby the firm can affect 
its bargaining power relative to both inside and outside suppliers.
4
  According to this argument, a 
balancing of bargaining power relative to both inside and outside suppliers determines the 
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 He and Nickerson (2006) analyze certain justifications for the mixed use of these organization modes in the 
trucking industry. 
4
 Porter (1980) says: “If a firm is dealing with suppliers or customers who wield significant bargaining power and 
reap returns on investment in excess of the opportunity cost of capital, it pays for the firm to integrate even if 
there are no other savings from integration” ( p. 307). 
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optimal organization mode for the firm. Michael (2000), Simester and Knez (2002), and 
Rothaermel, Hitt, and Jobe (2006) are interesting empirical studies following this tradition.  
In the present study, we design a model to analyze a firm’s procurement of labor input. The labor 
input can be supplied either internally with the wage negotiated between the trade union and the 
firm or alternatively can be acquired based on an external contract at terms negotiated with a 
subcontractor. We assume that bargaining within the context of a labor market where the firm 
cannot control its own bargaining power determines the wage for in-house production. 
Furthermore, we assume that outsourcing provides an option for the firm to potentially exploit a 
marginal cost advantage. However, an increased fraction of outsourcing can be realized only at 
the expense of the subcontractor's increased bargaining power.  In this way, our model 
formalizes the idea that the optimal organizational mode balances a potential cost advantage 
against the subcontractor's increased bargaining power. Within such a framework, we investigate 
two bargaining regimes distinguished by the relative timing of negotiations: 1) negotiations 
where the firm simultaneously bargains with the labor union and subcontractor, and 2) 
negotiations where the firm sequentially bargains with these parties. We assume these 
negotiations take place conditional on the firm’s sourcing decision.  
In the present analysis, multiple sourcing emerges as the optimal organizational mode, because 
the allocation of how to procure the labor input balances the potential cost advantage against the 
subcontractor's increased bargaining power. This mechanism for multiple sourcing complements 
those we know from the existing literature.  Inderst (2008) shows that single sourcing is not 
optimal for a buyer facing suppliers with convex costs unless the buyer has sufficiently strong 
market power. Du, Lu and Tao (2006) analyze a production function which separates 
headquarter services and component inputs and they assume that the headquarter has stronger 
bargaining power with respect to internal than to external component suppliers. However, 
contrary to our study they focus exclusively on exogenous bargaining power and demonstrate 
how the headquarter can benefit from bi-sourcing, because it generates a cross threat effect when 
negotiating with the two different input suppliers. Furthermore, Du, Lu and Tao (2006) compare 
the profit associated with bi-sourcing with that associated with single sourcing, but they do not 
structurally characterize the optimal production mode.
5
 Shy and Stenbacka (2005) characterize 
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 Du, Lu, and Tao (2009) explore this mechanism within the framework of a model of international trade. 
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the equilibrium fraction of outsourced inputs within a framework where the production of the 
final good requires a large number of potentially heterogeneous inputs and where outsourcing 
generates monitoring costs, which increase as a convex function of the number of production 
lines managed by external suppliers. However, they assume that each component has to be 
completely outsourced or produced entirely in-house. Another approach, developed by van 
Mieghem (1999) and Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007), focuses on an environment with uncertainty 
and characterizes the production mode which under such circumstances maximize the option 
value associated with outsourcing. Finally, our study also relates to the literature on second 
sourcing by multinationals. In this literature stream, the objective is to explain why 
multinationals simultaneously export and engage in foreign direct investments (FDI), and for that 
purpose scholars have developed both strategic approaches (see Choi and Davidson (2004)) and 
real options approaches (see Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994)).  
We design our model in such a way that the firm’s choice of organizational mode, more 
precisely the proportion of inputs outsourced, serves as a commitment relative to the stage of 
interrelated bargaining. At this bargaining stage, the firm negotiates the factor prices for the 
internally and externally sourced inputs either simultaneously or sequentially. Formally, we 
model these negotiations through Nash bargaining, with the particular methodological novelty 
that the subcontractor’s bargaining power is an increasing function of the proportion of 
production outsourced to this subcontractor. This way the organizational mode serves as a 
strategic device whereby the firm can influence the negotiated input prices since it determines 
the subcontractor's bargaining power.  
An extensive literature focuses on the analysis of bargaining as well as on various aspects of the 
Nash bargaining solution in particular. In standard versions of the Nash bargaining games (as 
surveyed by, for example, Muthoo (1999)), the bargaining power is simply an exogenous feature 
of the negotiation. In some more elaborate versions of bargaining, for example the model of 
strategic bargaining developed by Shaked and Sutton (1984), the outside option is endogenized.  
However, we are not aware of any model of bargaining with the feature that the bargaining 
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power coefficient is endogenous.
6
  In our model, the optimal production mode balances cost 
advantages achievable through outsourcing against the increased bargaining power of the 
subcontractor associated with outsourcing.  There is also a recent literature on the pattern of 
bargaining where exogenous bargaining power strategically determines the sequence of related 
negotiations.  For example, Marshall and Merlo (2004) examine the case where one labor 
supplier (the union) chooses the sequence in which it negotiates with firms.  Marx and Shaffer 
(2007) consider sequential negotiations with two sellers and one buyer and examine 
configurations where the buyer engages in multi-sourcing.       
We demonstrate analytically how multiple sourcing emerges as an organizational mechanism to 
balance cost advantages associated with outsourcing against the subcontractor's increased 
bargaining power. In particular, our model predicts single sourcing, that is, either complete in-
house production or complete outsourcing, if the bargaining power of the external supplier is 
independent of the proportion of outsourced production. We also explore the effects of the 
bargaining structure on the optimal production mode. In this respect, we find that the optimal 
proportion of outsourcing is lower with sequential negotiations than with simultaneous 
negotiations. Furthermore, we characterize the relationship between the optimal production 
modes and the order in which the firm conducts sequential negotiations.  
Our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, we characterize the 
optimal production mode with simultaneous bargaining. In Section 4, we explore the 
implications of the order of negotiations with sequential bargaining. Section 5 concludes.  The 
Appendix provides formal proofs for the analytical results. 
 
2. The Model 
We design a model to analyze a firm’s procurement of labor input. The labor input can be 
supplied either internally with the wage negotiated between the trade union and the firm or 
alternatively can be acquired based on a contract at terms negotiated with an external 
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 For an extensive and general discussion of the sources of bargaining power in wage negotiations, we refer to 
Manzini and Snower (2002), and for a general perspective on bargaining considerations relevant for outsourcing, 
we refer to de Fontenay and Gans (2008).  
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subcontractor. We assume that bargaining within the context of a labor market where the firm 
cannot control its own bargaining power determines the wage for in-house production. 
Furthermore, we assume that outsourcing provides an option for the firm to potentially exploit a 
marginal cost advantage.  
We model the formation of wages and subcontractor unit prices as a two-stage game where in the 
first stage the firm commits itself to the production mode, that is, the proportion of production 
that is conducted in-house (1-x) and the proportion supplied by the subcontractor (x). 
Conditional on the production mode, in the second stage, the firm engages in two Nash 
bargaining games (NBGs):1) the firm negotiates with the trade union regarding the wage in order 
to produce the proportion (1-x) of its output, and 2) the firm negotiates with the subcontractor in 
order to establish the unit price, , which applies to the proportion x of its output.   
Formally, we model the bargaining game between the firm and the trade union according to: 
,  (1) 
where P is the price the firm obtains for its output,  is the surplus to the firm 
attributable to the portion of output produced in-house,  is the outside option of the firm’s 
workforce, and  is the (constant) bargaining power of the trade union.  If the wage negotiations 
fail, we assume that the associated proportion of output will not be produced.  In other words, the 
firm commits the proportion (1-x) of its output for in-house production, and if the wage 
negotiations fail, that proportion of the production is not realized.    
We determine the price of the input supplied by the subcontractor as the solution to the Nash 
bargaining game: 
  ,    (2) 
where  denotes the outside option of the subcontractor, that is, the price it could obtain for the 
alternative use of its capacity. The factor  denotes the surplus to the firm and applies to the 
proportion x of output committed to the subcontractor.  Again, we assume that if negotiations fail 
with the subcontractor, then that proportion of output will not be produced.  
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We assume two qualitatively important differences between the bargaining problems (1) and (2).  
First, we assume that the reservation price associated with in-house supply of labor is higher than 
that associated with external supply of labor, that is, 00 w . This means that outsourcing offers 
an option for the firm to exploit a potential cost advantage. Second, we assume a crucial 
difference in the nature of the firm's bargaining power between the two sourcing modes. With in-
house sourcing of labor, the wage formation takes place within the framework of negotiations 
between the firm and the trade union. These negotiations take place with boundary conditions 
determined by labor laws and labor market institutions that are largely beyond the control of the 
firm. We capture this feature by assuming that the bargaining power coefficient is constant and 
independent of the proportion of in-house production. The contractual freedom is significantly 
larger for the negotiations between the firm and the external supplier. We assume that the 
subcontractor's bargaining power is an increasing function of the proportion of output supplied 
by the subcontractor. Formally, we assume that the subcontractor’s bargaining power is a 
continuous, differentiable, and strictly increasing function ( , with the additional 
boundary conditions that 00   and  1 .  
Prior to the negotiations regarding the input prices, the firm commits to its profit-maximizing 
production mode, that is, the proportion of production that is outsourced. When determining its 
production mode, the firm anticipates the outcome of the bargaining games. Overall, the firm’s 
optimal procurement strategy balances potential cost advantages associated with outsourcing 
against the subcontractor's increased bargaining power. In our detailed analysis, incorporated in 
Sections 3 and 4, we investigate two bargaining regimes distinguished by the sequences of 
negotiations: 1) negotiations where the firm bargains with the trade union and subcontractor 
simultaneously, and 2) negotiations where the firm bargains with these parties sequentially.  
The feature that the bargaining power is a function of the production volume allocated to one of 
the suppliers is an interesting and novel property from a methodological point. Earlier studies 
have modeled endogeneous bargaining power through the reservation values (see Muthoo 
(1999)). In our model, the optimal production mode determines the bargaining power of the 
subcontractor (and the firm).  Multiple sourcing is derived as a result of the bargaining power 
being an increasing function of the proportion of the production being subcontracted.  Another 
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interesting feature of our study is that we are able to characterize the consequences of the relative 
timing of negotiations by comparing simultaneous bargaining with sequential bargaining.  
 
3. Simultaneous Bargaining 
In this section, we analyze the configuration where the firm engages in simultaneous negotiations 
with the trade union in order to determine wages and with the subcontractor in order to determine 
the price of external supply. Formally, we find this Nash bargaining solution by solving the 
optimization problems (1) and (2) simultaneously.  The necessary first-order conditions 
associated with (1) and (2) show that the negotiated wage is a downward sloping function of the 
external supply price and vice versa. In other words, the negotiated input prices associated with 
the two alternative production modes are strategic substitutes. Solving the system of equations 
determined by the first-order conditions, we can give the simultaneous Nash bargaining solution 
by:
7
  
                                                   
and    
                                                   . 
The negotiated price for the external supplier incorporates a markup over its reservation price. 
This markup is proportional to the gains from trade 0P  with the subcontractor’s bargaining 
power )(x  as the proportionality factor. The negotiated price for the outsourced input depends 
on the firm’s production mode through the bargaining power of the subcontractor. Analogously, 
the negotiated wage incorporates a markup over the outside option available to unionized 
workers. Also, for internal labor this markup is proportional to the gains from trade 0wP   with 
the union’s bargaining power e  as the proportionality factor. Within the framework of this 
model, the negotiated wage does not depend on the firm’s production mode. 
The profit associated with the simultaneous Nash bargaining solution is:    
                                                          
7
 We can easily show that the second-order conditions for optimality are satisfied. 
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                             , 
where  is the total surplus available. In this profit, we subtract the 
markups to the subcontractor and the unionized workers from the total surplus.  This is the profit 
that is relevant for the firm when it determines the production mode in anticipation of the 
negotiated input prices associated with in-house production and outsourcing.  
We can express the optimal proportion ( Nx ) of outsourced production implicitly as the solution 
to the following differential equation:
8
 
  .  (3) 
The first-order condition (3) captures three effects associated with a marginal increase in 
outsourcing. The first component, 00 w , captures the savings in marginal costs imposed by 
outsourcing. The second component, , denotes the marginal cost 
increase associated with the subcontractor's increased bargaining power. The third component, 
, captures that increased outsourcing causes a marginal benefit to the firm by 
removing rents from the trade union. Overall, the first-order condition (3) requires that the profit-
enhancing effects exactly balance the marginal costs at the optimal proportion of outsourcing. 
Let us first characterize the optimal production mode if the bargaining power of the 
subcontractor is constant, say cx  )( . Under such circumstances the firm would find single 
sourcing optimal according to the following:   
Result 1: If the bargaining power of the subcontractor is constant, cx  )( , we can 
characterize the optimal production mode by:  
(a) complete in-house production (x=0) when 
0
0
0
00











P
wP
P
w
ec   
(b) complete outsourcing (x=1) otherwise. 
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 The second-order condition for an internal production mode solution with multiple sourcing is satisfied if 
. 
10 
 
If there is no cost advantage to outsourcing ( ), conditions for single sourcing in Result 1 
would reduce to direct comparisons between the bargaining power coefficients βc and βe.  In 
Result 1, we assume that the firm maintains in-house production when the bargaining powers 
satisfy the linear relationship
0
0
0
00











P
wP
P
w
ec . 
So far, we have delineated circumstances under which single sourcing is optimal. Next we ask: 
Under which conditions is a production mode with multiple sourcing optimal? Formally, 
multiple sourcing is optimal if the optimal proportion of outsourced production, Nx , satisfies 
that 10  Nx . For this purpose, we shift to the general case with the subcontractor’s 
bargaining power as a continuous, differentiable, and strictly increasing function with the 
additional boundary conditions that 00   and  1 . Contingent on these 
boundary conditions, we formulate the following sufficient condition for multiple sourcing to be 
optimal: 
 
Result 2: Multiple sourcing is the optimal production mode if the boundary conditions of the 
subcontractor’s bargaining power satisfy:  
0
0
0
00
0

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
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P
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e    and   
0
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0
00)1(











P
wP
P
w
e  .          (4) 
 
The condition on 0  in (4) guarantees that initially some outsourcing would occur.  The second 
condition in (4) on   )1( makes it too expensive to outsource all production.    
In this model, multiple sourcing is an organizational mechanism to balance cost advantages 
associated with outsourcing against the subcontractor's increased bargaining power. As explained 
in the introduction, this mechanism for multiple sourcing complements those presented in the 
existing literature. The first-order condition (3) implies that the optimal production mode has the 
following interesting comparative statics properties: 
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Result 3: If the second-order condition  holds, the optimal proportion of 
outsourcing ( Nx ) is an increasing function of  and  and is a decreasing function of  P and 
. 
The comparative statics properties with respect to , , and  are intuitive and 
straightforward. As one type of input becomes costlier, the firm diverts more resources towards 
the alternative production mode. Similarly, a higher bargaining power of the internal source 
makes outsourcing more attractive.  An increased value of production (P) enhances the surplus 
for all negotiating partners. This makes the firm more sensitive to changes in the bargaining 
power that the degree of outsourcing affects.   
 
4. Sequential Bargaining 
So far we have analyzed a configuration where the firm negotiates with the trade union and the 
subcontractor simultaneously. In this section, we focus on a sequential pattern of bargaining, 
where the firm’s negotiations with one party serve as a commitment relative to its negotiations 
with the other party. 
  
4.1 Sequential Bargaining with the Negotiated Wage as a Commitment 
In this section, we investigate a sequential pattern of bargaining with the feature that the 
negotiated wage serves as an irreversible commitment relative to the firm’s negotiations with the 
external subcontractor. With such a timing structure, the firm conducts the wage negotiations in 
anticipation of its subsequent negotiation regarding the terms of outsourcing. Such a timing 
structure seems plausible if the negotiated outsourcing contracts have short horizons relative to 
the horizons of negotiated wage contracts.  This may well be the case in industries where the 
production can be flexibly outsourced, that is, where the subcontractors have the knowhow and 
capacity to carry out the production without relationship-specific investments.  
12 
 
Given that the firm has reached a wage agreement, w, for producing the proportion x1   in-
house, we determine the price of the input supplied by the subcontractor as the solution to the 
Nash bargaining game:  
   , 
which yields the Nash bargaining solution:  
    . 
In anticipation of this input price associated with outsourcing, we determine the wage as the 
solution to: 
 
.   (5) 
The above optimization problem captures that the value to the firm of reaching a wage 
agreement is .  This value incorporates as an embedded option the 
value to the firm of subsequently reaching an agreement with the external supplier at the 
negotiated price .  Substituting F  into the above and solving for w, we find that the 
negotiated wage is: 
                    ,     
where, as earlier,  .  By substituting Lw  and 
F  back into the 
profit function, we find that sequential bargaining implies the following profit to the firm:  
   .   (6) 
From (6) we can characterize the optimal production mode with sequential negotiations Lx  by:
9
 
 .     (7) 
 
                                                          
9
 As in the previous section, we assume the sufficient second-order condition to hold true. 
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If the bargaining power of the subcontractor were constant, cx  )( , we can directly conclude 
that the optimal production mode would be full outsourcing as long as 00 w .  
In the general case, we can make use of (3) and (7) to compare the optimal production mode with 
sequential negotiations with that associated with simultaneous negotiations. In this respect, we 
can report the following finding: 
Result 4: Consider sequential negotiations such that the firm first reaches a wage agreement 
with the trade union. With such sequential negotiations, the optimal proportion of outsourced 
production is lower than that associated with simultaneous negotiations, that is,  NL xx  .  
 
The relationship between the optimal production modes under sequential and simultaneous 
negotiation is very interesting, particularly in light of the associated relationship between the 
factor prices. We can show that:  
   0))(1()()( 0   Pxxxwxw
LLNNLL , 
meaning that the negotiated wage is higher with sequential than with simultaneous negotiations. 
This finding is indeed consistent with Result 4, as the relationship LN xx    also implies that: 
0)()(  LLNN xx  .  
The relationship 
NL xx   implies that the trade union benefits from sequential bargaining 
compared with simultaneous bargaining, as )1()1(
NNLL xwxw  . Conversely, with 
sequential negotiations, where the firm determines wages prior to the terms of the contract for 
external supply, the surplus to the subcontractor is smaller than with simultaneous bargaining, as 
NNLL xx   . Consequently, we can conclude that the in-house supplier, who is part of the first-
round negotiations, benefits at the expense of the subcontractor, who is part of the second-round 
negotiations.  
In light of our assumption that the reservation price associated with in-house supply of labor is 
higher than that associated with external supply ( 00 w ), Result 4 has interesting implications 
14 
 
for total welfare.  Suppose that we define total welfare as the unweighted sum of the firm’s 
profit, the surplus to the labor union and to the subcontractor. Under such circumstances, 
outsourcing clearly promotes total welfare in a monotonic way such that total welfare would be 
maximized with complete outsourcing. Based on this argument, we can formulate the following: 
 
Result 5: Simultaneous bargaining promotes total welfare as compared with sequential 
bargaining. 
 
For a general function of the bargaining power, )(x , we are unable to determine whether the 
firm benefits or not from sequential negotiations compared with simultaneous negotiations. In 
order to be able to compare the effects for the firm’s profits of the two patterns of negotiation, 
we focus on a linear bargaining power function with . This particular 
bargaining power function satisfies the general conditions we have imposed in the analysis so 
far. For this linear bargaining power function, it follows directly from (3) that we can give the 
optimal production mode with simultaneous bargaining by: 
    
)(2
)(
0
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wPw
x eN  . 
Similarly, from (7) we can give the optimal production mode with sequential bargaining by: 
   
)(2 0
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

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w
x L  . 
Substituting the optimal production modes for simultaneous and sequential bargaining into the 
profit function, we find after simplification that: 
 ),,(),,( LLLLNNNN wxwx   
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Consequently, we can draw the following conclusion for a linear bargaining power function with 
:   
Result 6: The firm prefers simultaneous bargaining to sequential bargaining such that the 
negotiated wage serves as an irreversible commitment relative to the firm’s negotiations with the 
external subcontractor.  
According to Result 6, the firm has an incentive to design a bargaining structure whereby it 
simultaneously negotiates with respect to the wages and the terms of external supply.  By 
synchronizing the start and termination of these contracts, the firm could facilitate simultaneous 
bargaining.  Alternatively, the firm could also facilitate this by keeping the terms of contracts 
undisclosed to either party. 
  
4.2 Sequential Bargaining with the External Supplier Contract as a Commitment 
 
In this subsection, we investigate a sequential pattern of bargaining with the order of negotiations 
reversed. This means that the terms of the contract with the external supplier serves as an 
irreversible commitment relative to the firm’s wage negotiations associated with in-house 
supply. Such a timing structure applies to situations where the contracts with external suppliers 
have long horizons relative to those of negotiated wage contracts.  This could very well capture 
industries where the external supplier has to make highly irreversible and firm-specific 
investments.  
Conditional on a negotiated price,  , for the proportion x  of input supplied by the subcontractor,  
we determine the wage as the solution to the Nash bargaining game:  
   , 
which yields the Nash bargaining solution:  
    . 
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In anticipation of this wage for in-house supply, we determine the price for external supply as the 
solution to: 
  
. 
   
  denotes the value to the firm of reaching 
an agreement with respect to   With this sequence of bargaining, the value incorporates as an 
embedded option the value to the firm of subsequently reaching a wage agreement at the 
negotiated wage of  w
F
.  Not reaching an agreement in the first stage implies not being able to 
proceed, that is, all the production is required in order to satisfy existing sales agreements.  
 Based on the appropriate substitution of w
F
, we can give the negotiated price for external supply 
by: 
                                   . 
By substituting L  and Fw  back into the profit function, we find that sequential bargaining with 
the subcontractor negotiating first implies the following profit to the firm:  
                          . 
Differentiating this profit function with respect to x, we find the following necessary condition 
for the firm’s optimal production mode, Cxx  , with this sequential pattern of bargaining:  
     .0)()()(1)()1()()( 00000  wPwxwPxxx eCeCCC       (8) 
We can compare the optimal production modes of this pattern of bargaining ( Cx ) with that of the 
alternative order of negotiations ( Lx ) or with that associated with simultaneous bargaining ( Nx ). 
Formally, this involves an explicit comparison between (3), (7), and (8). At a general level, such 
a comparison yields results with fairly limited transparency.  A comparison between (7) and (8) 
reveals that the characterization of the optimal production mode is significantly more complex 
for the bargaining sequence where the firm first negotiates with the external supplier.  The reason 
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for this is that the bargaining power of the subcontractor depends on the production mode.  For 
that reason, we again rely on a linear bargaining power function with , as 
in Subsection 4.1.  
For the purpose of facilitating more transparent comparisons in this subsection, we normalize by 
assuming that 00  . This imposes no loss of generality and essentially means that 0w  captures 
the extent to which the reservation price associated with in-house supply of labor is higher than 
that associated with external supply of labor. With this normalization, we can make use of (3), 
(7), and (8) to calculate that the optimal production modes associated with the three different 
bargaining patterns are: 
Pa
wP
x eeN
2
)1( 0    , 
Pa
w
x L
2
0  , and 
 0
0
)1(2
)1()1)1((
wPa
waPa
x
ee
eeC




  , 
respectively.  
We first compare Cx  with
Nx , for which we can report the following result:  
 
Result 7: Consider sequential negotiations such that the firm first negotiates with the external 
subcontractor. With such sequential negotiations, the optimal proportion of outsourced 
production is lower than that associated with simultaneous negotiations, that is,  NC xx  .  
 
By combining Results 4 and 7, we can conclude that the optimal proportion of outsourcing is 
higher with simultaneous negotiations than with sequential negotiations independent of the order 
in which the firm conducts these sequential negotiations.  
We must still compare the optimal production modes across the two patterns of bargaining with 
sequential negotiations. Based on a detailed comparison of Cx  with
Lx , we can formulate the 
following result: 
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Result 8: The relationship between the optimal production modes in the two patterns of 
bargaining with sequential negotiations is determined by the following conditions: 
(a) Assume that 
0
2
w
a
a
P

 . If the firm first negotiates with the external subcontractor, the 
optimal proportion of outsourcing is lower than if it first negotiates with the trade union, 
that is, 
LC xx  .  
(b)  Assume that 
0
2
w
a
a
P

  and define eˆ  as the solution to the equation 
   000 )ˆ1(ˆ)1(ˆ)1)1(ˆ( wPwwaPaP eeee   . The optimal production 
modes satisfy that LC xx   if and only if ee 
ˆ .   
According to Result 8, the difference between P and 
0
w as well as the exogenous bargaining 
power of the trade union determine the relationship between the optimal production modes 
associated with the two patterns of bargaining with sequential negotiations. According to Result 
8 (a), when the difference between P and 
0
w is sufficiently small, the optimal proportion of 
outsourcing is always lower if the firm first negotiates with the external subcontractor than if it 
first negotiates with the trade union. If the difference between P and 
0
w is sufficiently large, 
Result 8 (b) specifies that we can determine the relationship between the optimal production 
modes for the two sequences of negotiations by the exogenous bargaining power of the trade 
union. More precisely, the optimal proportion of outsourcing is larger when the firm negotiates 
first with the external supplier if the trade union has sufficiently strong bargaining power. 
Consistent with the argument presented in association with Result 5, the proportion of 
outsourcing determines the total welfare in a monotonic way. In light of this argument, Result 8 
(a) and 8 (b) characterize the welfare effects of sequential bargaining with different sequences of 
negotiations. More precisely, sequential bargaining with wages negotiated first has welfare gains 
compared with the opposite sequence of negotiations if 
0
2
w
a
a
P

 . This condition is likely 
satisfied if the prevailing technology has labor as the predominant production factor.  However, 
the exogenous bargaining power of the trade union determines the welfare effects of the different 
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sequences of bargaining if  
0
2
w
a
a
P

 , which would be more likely to hold when there are 
multiple production factors.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This analysis has characterized a firm’s optimal production mode in a setting where labor is the 
only production factor. This input can be supplied either internally based on wage negotiations or 
acquired at terms negotiated with an external subcontractor.  Within the framework of such a 
model, we establish analytically how multiple sourcing emerges as an organizational mechanism 
to balance cost advantages associated with outsourcing against the subcontractor's increased 
bargaining power. In particular, our model predicts single sourcing, that is, either complete in-
house production or complete outsourcing, if the bargaining power of the external supplier is 
independent of the proportion of outsourced production. We also compare the effects of the 
bargaining structure on the optimal production mode. In this respect, we find that the optimal 
proportion of outsourcing is lower with sequential negotiations than with simultaneous 
negotiations. Furthermore, we also characterize the relationship between the optimal production 
modes and the order in which the firm conducts sequential negotiations.  
Our analysis has focused on asymmetric input suppliers insofar as we assume that the insider, the 
trade union, has exogenous bargaining power, whereas the bargaining power of the external 
supplier is derived as a function of the production mode. In Section 2, we attempt to justify that 
such an asymmetry is plausible for an analysis of a firm’s procurement of labor input. However, 
our model could very well be extended to investigate the problem of a firm facing multiple 
suppliers of an arbitrary input or multiple retailers in such a way that the bargaining power of 
each supplier (retailer) would be a function of the production volume to the supplier (retailer) in 
question. Such an extension would add significantly to our knowledge of optimal sourcing for a 
firm facing multiple suppliers (retailers).  
When comparing different bargaining patterns, we primarily focus on the effect of the bargaining 
pattern on the optimal production mode. We have offered a very limited analysis of the optimal 
bargaining pattern from the firm’s point of view. In that respect, we have only established that 
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the firm prefers simultaneous bargaining to sequential bargaining with such an order of 
negotiations that the wage serves as an irreversible commitment relative to the firm’s 
negotiations with the external subcontractor. Clearly, our approach could be extended to yield a 
more systematic analysis of the optimal bargaining pattern for the firm.   
 
Appendix: Proofs of Results 
 
Proof of Result 2:  Differentiating the profit associated with the simultaneous Nash bargaining 
solution with respect to x, we find that  )(x 
. In particular, it holds true that   if: 
0
0
0
00
0











P
wP
P
w
e  , 
and that   if: 
0
0
0
00)1(











P
wP
P
w
e
  
.  
Because the profit function )(x is continuous, differentiable, and strictly concave, these 
conditions imply a unique interior production mode 10 
Nx   with the property that 
0)(  Nx .         QED 
 
Proof of Result 3: Rearranging (3), we have:    
 . 
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According to the second-order condition, the L.H.S. of the above equation is strictly increasing 
in x. The comparative statics results follow from the observations that 0
0



w
K
 , 
0


e
K

,  0
)(
)()1(
2
0
0
0








 P
wPK e  ,  and  0
)(
)()1(
2
0
00 







P
w
P
K e .  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Result 4: According to (3), the optimal proportion of outsourcing with simultaneous 
negotiations satisfies:  
   
0
0
0
00)()(











P
wP
P
w
xxx e
NNN . 
According to (7), the optimal proportion of outsourcing with sequential negotiations is:  
   
0
00)()(






P
w
xxx LLL . 
The second-order condition  implies that the common L.H.S. of these 
equations is increasing as a function of x. We can therefore conclude that 
NL xx  .    QED 
 
Proof of Result 7: By direct substitution, we find that the inequality 
NC xx   is equivalent to:  
    200 )1()1()1)1(( wPwaPaP eeee   . 
We define  0)1()1)1(()( waPaPg eee    and  
2
0)1()( wPh eee   . 
Clearly, both of these functions are strictly increasing with 0)()1()( 0  wPaPg e  and
  0)()1(2)( 00  wPwPh eee  . Furthermore, 
2)0( Pg  , 2
0 )()0( wh  , 
 0)1()1( waaPPg   , and 
2)1( Ph  . From these properties, we can directly conclude that 
 1,0)()(  eee hg  . Consequently, it holds true that 
NC xx  .     QED 
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Proof of Result 8: By direct substitution, we find that the inequality LC xx   is equivalent to:  
    000 )1()1()1)1(( wPwwaPaP eeee   . 
We define  0)1()1)1(()( waPaPg eee    and  00 )1()( wPwk eee   . 
Both of these functions are strictly increasing with 0)()1()( 0  wPaPg e  and 
0)()( 00  wPwk e .  Furthermore, we observe that 
2)0( Pg  and 2
0 )()0( wk  . By 
substituting in 1e , we find that: 
  )1()1()1( 00 kPwwaaPPg   if and only if 0
2
w
a
a
P

 .  
From these properties, we can directly conclude that  1,0)()(  eee kg   if 0
2
w
a
a
P

 . 
This completes the proof of Result 8 (a).  
If, on the other hand, 
0
2
w
a
a
P

  , it holds true that )1()1( kg  . From the established 
properties of the functions )( eg  and )( ek  , this implies that )()( ee kg   if and only if 
ee 
ˆ , where we define eˆ  as the solution to the equation 
   000 )ˆ1(ˆ)1(ˆ)1)1(ˆ( wPwwaPaP eeee   . This completes the proof of 
Result 8 (b).           QED  
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